March 2012

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DEFENDING AGAINST A CHARGE OF OBSCENITY IN THE INTERNET AGE: HOW GOOGLE SEARCHES CAN ILLUMINATE MILLER'S "CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS"

Shannon Creasy*

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of speech is one of our most fundamental and treasured rights, requiring "ceaseless vigilance . . . to prevent . . . erosion by Congress or the States." However, "the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances." Despite the broad language of the First Amendment, certain types of speech are not afforded protection under the Constitution. Such unprotected speech is subject to government regulation that can include bans and criminal punishment. Obscenity is a type of unprotected speech, having been described by the Supreme Court as expression "utterly without redeeming social importance."  

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1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (referring to speech as a "fundamental freedom" that has "contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society").
2. Id.
4. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (citing Roth, 354 U.S. 476) (stating that key to the holding was "the Court's rejection of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First Amendment"); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (explaining that certain "narrowly limited classes of speech" including obscenity, "fighting" words, and libel fall outside the protections of the First Amendment); JANINE S. HILLER & RONNIE COHEN, INTERNET LAW & POLICY 50-51 (2002).
5. Roth, 354 U.S. at 492-93 (holding that the state criminal obscenity statute is constitutional); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)) (discussing categories of unprotected speech and stating that criminal punishment for use of "epithets or personal abuse" would not offend the Constitution); HILLER & COHEN, supra note 4, at 50-51; H. Franklin Robbins, Jr. & Steven G. Mason, The Law of Obscenity or Absurdity?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 517, 535-36 (2003) (discussing the potential penalties that accompany criminal obscenity convictions).
6. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 476) (stating that key to the holding was "the Court's rejection of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First Amendment"); Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 ("We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; HILLER & COHEN, supra note 4, at 50-51. But see Roth, 354 U.S. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502-11 (1951)) (for "speech to be punishable [it] must have some relation to action which could be penalized by [the]
Obscenity law has been controversial since its inception, and over the years prosecutions of violations have been sporadic.⁷ Under the George W. Bush Administration, the federal government stepped up enforcement of federal obscenity laws.⁸ "Mounting the biggest attack on porn since the Reagan Administration," the government secured forty obscenity convictions during Bush's first term, compared to four convictions during President Clinton's two terms in office.⁹ Revealing an intention to continue the trend of aggressive enforcement, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales identified prosecuting obscenity offenses as fourth on the list of priorities for the Department of Justice in 2005.¹⁰

Widespread Internet access has also brought renewed attention to the issue of regulating obscene materials.¹¹ Although older obscenity cases often targeted literary works and then began focusing on films, modern criminal prosecutions typically involve images of sexual conduct,¹² which are nearly ubiquitous on the Internet.¹³

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⁹ Id.

¹⁰ See Shafer & Adams, supra note 7 (discussing Attorney General’s stated priorities).

¹¹ Dick Ackerman, Technology & Obscenity: Ever-Changing Legal Challenges, 10 NEXUS: J. OPINION 37, 37 (2005) ("[T]hese individuals are upset because pornography is no longer confined to little shops on the back streets of a city that they can avoid."); Sean Adam Shiff, Comment, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for Obscene and Indecent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 734–35 (1996) (discussing difficulties that new technologies create for courts with regard to applying obscenity standards and how recent legislative attention has focused on obscenity on the Internet).

¹² Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 542 (discussing the book burnings of ULYSSES as obscenity, despite it being listed as one of the "greatest novels of the twentieth century"); Doug Linder, Exploring Constitutional Conflicts, Regulation of Obscenity (2008), http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
Technological advances that allow pornographers to efficiently stream online video and view pictures have led to an explosion in the pornography market. As of 2006, sources tracking pornography statistics reported that there were approximately 4.2 million pornographic websites, accounting for 12% of the total sites on the Internet. Annual pornography revenue in the United States is estimated at over $13 billion. Additionally, every second, there are as many as 372 people searching “adult” terms online. This easy access to pornography has revived arguments on each side of the regulation issue, with anti-pornography groups calling for increased prosecutions to prevent moral decline and addiction, and free speech activists insisting that obscenity prosecutions violate the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. Obscenity jurisprudence remains controversial because “in the hands of a
government willing to use it, obscenity law remains a potentially potent tool of repression.”

Despite the controversy, a majority of Supreme Court Justices have consistently upheld laws that support the regulation of obscene materials. The path to a constitutional test for obscenity has not been an easy one. Concerns that regulation of any kind would have a chilling effect on protected speech led to “a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication.” This division resulted in bitter disagreement over how to differentiate protected expression from proscribable obscenity. While the Court clearly stated that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous” and that only “hard core” sexual conduct specifically defined by state statute is prosecutable, identifying the line between legal pornography and illegal obscenity has proven to be extremely difficult.

20. Boyce, supra note 7, at 325.
21. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (“It does not follow that no regulation of patently offensive ‘hard core’ materials is needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow unregulated access to heroin because it is a derivative of medicinal morphine.”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“There is universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956.”) (internal citations omitted); FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 194 (Richard A. Parker ed., 2003) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-4 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Federal Government should not have as much latitude as the States in regulating offensive material).
22. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22-37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Court has worked hard to define obscenity and concededly has failed.”); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulties the Court has had agreeing on a definition of obscenity); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution protects coarse expression as well as refined, and vulgarity no less than elegance.”); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Federal Government should not have as much latitude as the States in regulating offensive material).
23. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22-23, 24 (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968)).
24. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 843 (16th ed. 2007) (“The Warren Court’s attempt to define unprotected obscenity in Roth spawned a tortuous period of divided rulings . . . .”).
25. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 (explaining that only “hard-core” pornography can be prosecuted); Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
In *Miller v. California*, after years of wrestling with “the intractable obscenity problem,” the Court set out the three-prong obscenity test that remains in effect today. The *Miller* test requires that “an average person” apply “contemporary community standards” to judge whether material is obscene. Despite criticisms that the test suffers from the same vagueness problems as prior failed efforts, the Court has applied the *Miller* test for thirty-five years, upholding the constitutionality of federal and state criminal obscenity statutes.

Since the introduction of the *Miller* test, courts have struggled to identify and define “community standards.” Much debate has centered on how to determine the true values of a community, with defendants introducing a wide variety of evidence intended to establish those elusive standards. Certainly, the *Miller* Court never imagined the Internet and the level of complexity it has added to the process. Recently, a Florida man indicted on federal obscenity

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27. *Id.* at 37 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) (“Obscenity is to be determined by applying ‘contemporary community standards.’”).
28. *Id.* at 24.
29. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 85–86 n.9 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that obscenity is “incapable of definition with sufficient clarity to withstand attack on vagueness grounds”); *Miller*, 413 U.S. at 43–44 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Obscenity—which even we cannot define with precision—is a hodge-podge. To send men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process.”); Robbins & Mason, *supra* note 5, at 528 (explaining that the *Miller* test “suffers from the same frailties as its predecessors”).
charges approached this dilemma in a creative new way. Raymond McCowen proposed to introduce Google search engine data to establish the relevant community standards and to show that, by comparison to the material the residents of his community were searching for on the Internet, his material was not obscene. McCowen’s case settled out of court when he pleaded guilty to one count of money laundering, leaving open the question whether the courts would have allowed the data to be used as a window into the community values.

Whether Miller’s contemporary community standards test should be completely abandoned has been the subject of much debate and falls outside the scope of this work. To date, most governmental attempts at Internet regulation have been aimed at protecting children from online pornography, which is another issue that falls outside the scope of this work. This Note will, however, explore the challenges the courts have encountered when applying the community standards test, the ways in which both parties have attempted to shed light on Miller’s requirements, and how courts can simplify this process by allowing Internet search engine data to be introduced as evidence of the community’s values. To that end, Part I traces the history of obscenity law in the United States up to the current Miller test. Part II examines the application of the Miller test, analyzing the challenges involved in defining the community and the difficulties defendants face when trying to prove the standard with various types

35. Id.
39. See infra Part I, Part II, and Part III.
40. See infra Part I.

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of evidence. Finally, Part III argues in favor of more clearly identifying the relevant community and, under any definition of community, allowing Google searches (and other search engine data) to be admitted as evidence to establish the values of that community.

I. THE "TORTURED HISTORY" OF OBSCENITY LAW

A. Roots and Early Efforts at Regulation

Efforts to control sexual expression were relatively rare in the United States until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between the Civil War and the 1930s, federal courts largely followed a fairly precise rule from an early English case, Regina v. Hicklin. The Hicklin test allowed any material that could "deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences" to be banned as obscenity. This test had the unintended result of assessing materials based on the effect they had on the most susceptible, or sensitive, members of the community. Under Hicklin, books and other materials could be judged obscene based on the effect an insignificant, isolated passage had on a child. As Judge Learned Hand pointed out, the Hicklin test "would 'reduce our...
treatment of sex to the standards of a child’s library in the supposed interest of a salacious few.” To prevent this bizarre result, the Hicklin standard fell out of favor and was abandoned with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roth v. United States.

In Roth, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of obscenity directly for the first time. Having previously categorized obscenity with “fighting words” and libelous speech, the Court’s holding that federal obscenity statutes did not violate the Constitution was unsurprising. The Court merely affirmed what had previously been implied—that obscenity was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Roth Court expressly rejected the Hicklin test as unconstitutionally restrictive, piecing together a new test for obscenity from various lower court holdings. Designed to address the constitutional infirmities of the Hicklin test, the Roth test required that the material in question be viewed as a whole, rather than allowing portions to be judged individually. Additionally, instead of gearing the test to the most susceptible member of society, the new test required jurors to apply the perspective of the “average person.” The Roth test deemed material obscene when “to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of

49. Id. at 718 (citing United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
50. Weaver, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing rejection of the Hicklin test); Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 523–24 (discussing Judge Learned Hand’s reaction to the Hicklin test and the change with Roth).
52. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (categorizing obscenity with “fighting words” and libelous speech, Justice Murphy wrote that expressions of this nature are not an “essential part of any exposition of ideas, and . . . that any benefit . . . derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”).
53. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 92 (1972)) (“This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”); Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (“[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”); Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 2. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942). But see Boyce, supra note 7, at 317 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 512 (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (explaining that application of a test of community standards “would not be an acceptable one if religion, economics, politics, or philosophy were involved”).
54. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488–89.
55. Id. (rejecting the Hicklin standard for the test substituted by a lower court); Boyce, supra note 7, at 316.
56. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488, 490; Boyce, supra note 7, at 316.
the material taken as a whole appeals to [the] prurient interest."\(^{57}\) Initially seeming to resolve the definitional battles, the Roth test proved to be just the beginning of the Court’s struggle.\(^{58}\) Later opinions included seemingly minor alterations to the test that ultimately rendered it unworkable.\(^{59}\)

For years, the Court wrestled with the application of the Roth standard.\(^{60}\) When efforts to apply it continued to fail, the Court resorted to systematic case-by-case reviews, with the Justices each applying their own obscenity test.\(^{61}\) This practice resulted in the review and reversal of many lower court convictions without additional explanation or opinion, such that “judicial attempts to follow [the Court’s] lead conscientiously . . . often ended in hopeless confusion.”\(^{62}\)

B. Tweaking Roth to Get to Miller—If Only it Were That Simple

Finally, the Court’s efforts to gain consensus on a new obscenity test paid off.\(^{63}\) In Miller v. California, the Court reached majority
support for a new test. Fashioning the new *Miller* standard from the old *Roth* test, the *Miller* Court formulated a three-prong conjunctive test requiring the trier of fact to determine:

(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

If the material in question meets all three of the requirements of the test, that material is deemed obscene.

In the *Miller* opinion, the Court directly addressed several issues that made earlier test applications difficult. First, the Court expressly limited the definition of "obscene material" to items that deal with sex, specifically material depicting or describing "hard core" pornography. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the material at issue must be viewed as a whole and could not be examined piecemeal. Finally, the Court limited state regulation to only that sexual conduct specifically defined by statute, or authoritatively construed, as being illegal to depict or describe.

Despite these efforts, the *Miller* test has been widely criticized as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The "contemporary

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64. *Miller*, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
66. *Miller*, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 24.
68. See id. at 25-27 (defining and clarifying various issues that caused difficulties in the past).
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Id. at 23-24 ("State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited.").
72. *Miller*, 413 U.S. at 37-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Handelman, *supra* note 48, at 731-737 (discussing criticisms of the *Miller* test and difficulties its application presents). But see Richards & Calvert, *supra* note 8, at 262 (interviewing defense attorney Louis Sirkin, who discusses fear that a new
milton's "contemporary community standards" portion of the test has been particularly troublesome. Although an obscenity measure relying upon the "average conscience" and flexible enough to reflect modern views was not a new concept when Miller was decided, the Miller Court's holding essentially "collapsed the average person and community standards elements into single concept" to be applied to the first two prongs of the test. As a result, Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the proposition "that the First Amendment permits punishment for ideas that are 'offensive' to the particular judge or jury sitting in judgment is astounding." Addressing such constitutional criticisms directly, Chief Justice Burger held that the "contemporary community standards" test is "constitutionally adequate" and serves the "protective purpose" of insuring that the material "will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person—or indeed a totally insensitive one." Despite the Court's clear finding that the community standards test provides the necessary constitutional safeguards, the test is still widely criticized on constitutional grounds.

73. Boyce, supra note 7, at 320; Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 15; Deane, supra note 60, at 253; Handelman, supra note 48, at 726-27, 729-31 (discussing the difficulties of applying a community standard versus a national standard).
74. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (citing cases that attempted to settle on an average person's perspective with flexibility to change with the times); United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Learned Hand, J.) (stressing a need for flexibility in the definition of obscenity by suggesting that "the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and now").
75. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Any effort to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary on state power must resort to such indefinite concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,' and the like. The meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining them."); Weaver, supra note 32, at 10; Handelman, supra note 48, at 736 (discussing the community standards test and explaining that "[t]he major problem with the Miller standard is that it further opens an already wide door to subjective judgments of what is obscene"); Shiff, supra note 11, at 740 (explaining that the community standards are applied to the first two prongs of the Miller test).
76. Miller, 413 U.S. at 44.
77. Id. at 33-34 (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966)).
78. Boyce, supra note 7, at 320; Deane, supra note 60, at 253; Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 542 ("Obscenity laws are an ugly form of censorship, and censorship should never be tolerated.").
II. CHALLENGES OF APPLYING THE MODERN TEST

A. Identifying the Community—The Nation, the State, the City, or the Cyber-Community?

Although the “contemporary community standards” test has been governing law for almost four decades, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance for identifying the relevant community. Courtoptions post-Miller provide insight into what the community definition is not required to include, but give virtually no guidance as to what is constitutionally required. Critics debate whether the courts should apply a national standard, a statewide standard, a standard based on smaller community units, an “average adult” standard, or in Internet cases, a cyber-community standard. An inability to define the community is a serious concern because it prevents the defense from being able to properly exercise its right to put forward evidence to prove the community standards.

1. A National Standard Versus a Local Standard

Before Miller, the Supreme Court applied a national standard in federal obscenity cases. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Court stated that a local definition of the community did not provide sufficient

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79. SAMORISKI, supra note 7, at 267 (“Definitions under the Miller standard . . . can vary from place to place, judge to judge, jury to jury, and even from time to time.”); Shiff, supra note 11, at 742–43.
83. Manual Enter., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (“We think that the proper test under this federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose population reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of decency.”); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 10 (explaining that although national standard was applied, that approach never garnered majority support).
protection of rights deriving from the U.S. Constitution. Rejecting the application of a local standard, the Court pointed out that it had previously "explicitly refused to tolerate a result whereby 'the constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with state lines.'" Opponents of a national standard, however, argued that given the size and diversity of the United States, a national standard would be unascertainable. The requirement of a national standard was highly controversial and has never enjoyed majority support from the Court.

In Miller, the Court indicated that a local standard was appropriate. Finding no constitutional requirement for application of a national standard, the Court held that the jury instructions in Miller calling for jurors to apply a statewide standard did not violate the Constitution. However, a year later, in Hamling v. United States, the Court stated that the application of a national standard is not a constitutional violation either. Further clarifying what is not constitutionally required, in Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court held that juries in state obscenity prosecutions do not have to be instructed to apply a statewide standard. The Court explained that under Miller, jurors can "rely on the understanding of the community from which they came as to contemporary community standards." The Jenkins Court stated that, while "a [s]tate may choose to define . . . the standards in more precise geographic terms," it is not constitutionally required to do so, and the State can direct "jurors to apply

86. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity."); Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("I believe that there is no provable 'national standard' . . . ."); Deane, supra note 60, at 253 ("One of the principal disagreements between the Justices was whether a local or national standard should apply to the community standards test."). But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 587 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("[A]doption of a national standard is necessary in my view for any reasonable regulation of Internet obscenity."); Manual Ent. v. Weiss, 246 U.S. at 488 (setting out national standard for federal obscenity statutes).
87. Miller, 413 U.S. at 31 (finding no error where jury instructions called for a local standard).
88. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
The emergence of the Internet has further complicated the identification of the relevant community and has magnified the potential for harm. In the past, sellers of adult material could choose which communities were appropriate locations for retail operations or were safe distribution points. In contrast, sellers operating on the Internet often have limited control over where their products end up. Items posted on the Internet are immediately available for viewing and downloading by users around the world. Since the Internet defies geographic boundaries, and it is still not possible for website operators to reliably and effectively limit access based on geographical location, applying the community standards test could result in “individuals being prosecuted by the standard of the most restrictive community with access to the Internet.” Despite the potential for chilling Internet speech, the Supreme Court held in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, that it does not violate constitutional requirements for a statute aimed at Internet regulation.

93. Id.
94. Id.; Hamling, 418 U.S. at 103-09.
95. Nitke v. New York, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“While the community standards test was developed at a time when obscenity prosecutions were primarily local . . . and distributors chose the localities in which they mailed or displayed their material, online distribution is by definition nationwide.”); Ackerman, supra note 11, at 41-42; Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 17 (“The concept of community in Miller is particularly problematic in the Internet Age, where material can be downloaded in any community . . . .”); Tehranian, supra note 37, at 19.
96. Shiff, supra note 11, at 749.
97. Boyce, supra note 7, at 347; Tehranian, supra note 37, at 19.
98. Tehranian, supra note 37, at 19.
100. Tehranian, supra note 37, at 18.
to rely on ‘contemporary community standards’ in determining whether the materials are obscene.  

An early Internet case, United States v. Thomas, illustrates a strong argument for a uniform standard, such as a national or “cyberspace” standard for Internet cases. In Thomas, a husband and wife, operating an Internet bulletin board in California, were prosecuted after being caught in a sting operation. A United States Postal Inspector, posing as an online customer, purchased a subscription from the defendants that provided access to download pornographic materials in Memphis, Tennessee. The Government prosecuted the defendants in Tennessee, since that was where the materials were received, rather than in California, where the materials originated. The trial court instructed the jury to apply Memphis community standards, resulting in convictions on charges of interstate transmission of obscenity. The defendants in Thomas argued for a new definition of community for the Internet, such as a “cyber-community,” based on “broad-ranging connections among people in cyberspace rather than the geographic locale of the federal judicial district of the criminal trial.” The court declined to address the cyber-community issue, however, and focused instead on the fact that the defendants in this case had access to customer addresses and

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101. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 593 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that the use of “community standards” language by itself does not render the legislation unconstitutional, even though “[t]he Court of Appeals found that [the statute] in effect subjects every Internet speaker to the standards of the most puritanical community in the United States,” but while “[t]he concern is a real one, . . . it alone cannot suffice to invalidate [the statute]”). But see id. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield.”).

102. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 75–80; Shiff, supra note 11, at 745–46.


105. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 701, 709 (“[I]t is well-established that ‘there is no constitutional impediment to the government’s power to prosecute pornography dealers in any district into which the material is sent.’”).

106. Id. at 711.

107. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 79–80 (discussing “virtual communities” that consist of “netizens” and exist online, with members spread throughout the world but connected by these communities).

108. Shiff, supra note 11, at 745 (citing Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711).
could have prevented transmission into Tennessee.\textsuperscript{109} The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that “juries are properly instructed to apply the community standards of the geographic area where the materials are sent.”\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{B. Proving the Standard—Should the Material at Issue “Speak for Itself”?}\textsuperscript{111}

In obscenity prosecutions, the State is not obligated to provide proof of the community standards.\textsuperscript{112} Juries are presumed to already know the prevailing community standards.\textsuperscript{113} In \textit{Kaplan v. California}, the Supreme Court held that once the State has admitted the materials at issue into evidence, there is no constitutional requirement that the prosecution provide expert testimony “or for any other ancillary evidence of obscenity.”\textsuperscript{114} The allegedly obscene material “can and
does speak for itself” and is considered to be the best evidence of whether it is obscene.115

In some civil administrative hearings, where there was no right to trial by jury, however, a few courts have held that where the State did not provide any evidence defining the community standards, the issue could not be decided and the State failed to meet its burden of proof.116 For instance, in Golden Dolphin No. Two, Inc. v. State, the judge held that the prosecution failed to prove that a live show was obscene since the State did not present any evidence on the contemporary community standards.117 To avoid this potential result, States sometimes do provide evidence of the community standards.118 Usually, however, the prosecution has no burden to prove this element for the jury.119

While the prosecution has little motivation to provide evidence to define the relevant community standards, such evidence can be critical to the defendant’s case and should be allowed whether the prosecution submits such evidence or not.120 The Supreme Court has held that the “defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert testimony.”121 In his concurrence in Smith v. California, Justice Frankfurter stated that “[t]here is a right of one charged with obscenity . . . to enlighten the judgment of the tribunal . . . regarding the prevailing literary and moral community standards.”122

115. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 55–56; Wild, 422 F.2d at 36 (“Simply stated, hard core pornography . . . can and does speak for itself.”). But see Klaw, 350 F.2d at 167 (explaining that jurors had “impermissibly broad freedom to convict” because they had no more evidence to determine obscenity than the magazines themselves).


117. Golden Dolphin No. 2, Inc., 403 So. 2d at 1374.

118. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 63–65 (explaining that the Supreme Court generally disfavors expert testimony in obscenity cases, but sometimes it is wise to utilize it to offset defendant’s expert witnesses).

119. Id. at 64.

120. Illinois v. Nelson, 410 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding reversible error where trial court refused to admit defendant’s evidence because while “[t]he State does not have the burden of introducing any evidence as to what the state-wide community standard is . . . that cannot justify a court in denying the defendant the right to introduce the best evidence he can gather on this issue.”).

121. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 63 (quoting Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973)).

Defendants have attempted to introduce many types of evidence to establish the "contemporary community standards." Although courts sometimes allow such evidence, trial judges wield wide discretion in this area. And, even though exclusion of this type of evidence can cripple the defense, the Supreme Court has upheld convictions where evidence was excluded, ruling that any resulting error was harmless.

1. Introducing the Experts—Explaining the Standard

One type of evidence that can be helpful to both the prosecution and the defense in obscenity cases is expert witness testimony. Trial courts only allow expert testimony if the witness qualifies as an expert in the field and the information the witness provides is either something the layperson would not know, or it is at least "helpful" to the jurors in understanding the standard. While there is not a particular field that produces an "obscenity expert," a wide variety of individuals representing many fields have qualified as experts to provide insight into community standards, such as psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, ministers, and even police officers.

In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Supreme Court registered disapproval of the use of expert testimony in obscenity cases, stating that "[t]his is a not a subject that lends itself to the traditional use of expert testimony." However, in Miller, issued on the same day as

123. See WEAVER, supra note 32, at 61–77 (explaining different types of defense evidence commonly used such as comparable materials, public opinion surveys, experts, etc.).
124. Id. at 63 (explaining that the defense can "introduce both expert and non-expert evidence on community standards"); Boyce, supra note 7, at 350.
125. Boyce, supra note 7, at 350 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104–10 (1974)).
127. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 634–35.
128. Belleville v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., 744 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (allowing certified sex therapist with a Ph.D. in sex research to testify as expert witness for the defense); Showcase Cinemas, 274 S.E.2d at 580 (finding sufficient evidence presented as to community standards where clinical psychologist testified as expert witness for the State, and expert witness in "psychology, social theory and design and a graduate of numerous theological institutions and a teacher of sexology and sexual dysfunctioning [sic]" testified for one of the defendants); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 66; Sordillo, supra note 82, at 634–35.
Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court found no constitutional violation where the State’s expert witness was a police officer who had conducted a statewide survey on community standards. Most modern courts allow expert evidence to prove the community standards as long as the testimony is “relevant and not misleading to the jury.” In Illinois v. Nelson, the court held that expert witness testimony was properly excluded since it was not helpful because the data was “clear and self-explanatory so that the jurors should have no difficulty interpreting the results without expert aid.”

2. Surveys and Opinion Polls—Asking the Community

Surveys and opinion polls provide another source of insight into the standards of the community. While potentially useful to both parties, survey evidence is usually offered by the defense. For the prosecution, commissioning a poll is a strategic decision that must be carefully considered. Given that the State is not required to present evidence of the community standards, the prosecution runs the risk that the results could indicate community acceptance of the material. In such a case, the survey could then become exculpatory evidence benefiting the defense. However, proponents of prosecutorial use of survey evidence have advised that a carefully crafted and conducted survey could be used for years across multiple

130. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 n.12 (1973) (holding no constitutional error where the expert witness was a police officer who had many years of experience dealing with obscenity cases, had testified in other prosecutions, and had conducted an extensive survey).
131. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 637–638.
133. Weaver, supra note 32, at 71–72 (discussing need for prosecutors to more frequently use survey evidence); Sordillo, supra note 82, at 640–641.
134. Weaver, supra note 32, at 72. See Sordillo, supra note 82, at 645 (explaining that survey evidence can backfire for the prosecution if it reveals acceptance of the materials in the community, but the defense faces no such risk).
135. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 645.
trials, offering some protection in cases where courts require the State to provide evidence of the standard.\textsuperscript{138}

Regardless of which party offers a survey, it must meet certain requirements to be admissible as evidence.\textsuperscript{139} When determining whether to admit survey evidence, courts closely examine how precisely the poll touches on the specific issues involved.\textsuperscript{140} Since a visual image may be patently offensive but a verbal description of that image may not have the same impact, courts have held that survey evidence is inadmissible where questions are too general and do not properly describe the material at issue.\textsuperscript{141} For example, in United States v. Pryba, the court held that poll data was properly excluded because it was “not probative on whether the charged materials enjoy community acceptance” since the interviewees were not questioned “regarding the materials at issue or similar materials, but rather . . . [were asked about] their opinions on the viewing of ‘nudity and sex,’ defined broadly.”\textsuperscript{142} The court stated that “[c]ommunity acceptance is the touchstone of admissibility,” explaining that data that does not actually show acceptance in the community is irrelevant.\textsuperscript{143}

Survey questions must also be carefully crafted to ensure relevancy.\textsuperscript{144} Also, if the sample size and selection are not based on reliable scientific methods, the evidence will be vulnerable to attack on reliability and validity grounds.\textsuperscript{145} In Illinois v. Nelson, the appellate court held that exclusion of survey data compiled by an

\textsuperscript{138} \textsc{Weaver, supra} note 32, at 72.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.} at 71.

\textsuperscript{140} Sordillo, \textit{supra} note 82, at 623.

\textsuperscript{141} \textsc{State v. Midwest Pride IV, Inc.,} 721 N.E.2d 458, 467 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting survey as evidence of community standards because “not a single question in the survey describes the material alleged to be obscene or addresses any of the specific acts shown in the videotapes”); \textsc{State v. Tee & Bee, Inc.,} 600 N.W.2d 230, 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (citing \textsc{Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt.,} 588 N.W.2d 236 (Wis. 1999)) (excluding survey results because “survey respondents were not ‘sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charged materials,’ and, therefore, the survey results were irrelevant”); Sordillo, \textit{supra} note 82, at 642–43 (citing United States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 n.3, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1988)).


\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Id.} at 1230.

\textsuperscript{144} Sordillo, \textit{supra} note 82, at 642 (citing \textit{Pryba}, 678 F. Supp. at 1225) (holding survey was irrelevant because pollster’s “questions were not designed to elicit information about whether there was community acceptance of the actual materials in question or similar materials”).

\textsuperscript{145} \textsc{Weaver, supra} note 32, at 72.
expert in survey research was reversible error. There, the court found that the survey questions were relevant in evaluating the community standards, explaining that “survey evidence may be the only way to prove degrees of acceptability.” Similarly, in Belleville v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., the court held that the trial court erred by excluding survey evidence that was gathered by a law clerk through extensive travel to stores statewide and reviews of similar movies offered throughout the state.

In contrast, in Pryba, the court found that the survey data in that case, which was based on a “new approach to the study of community,” was “unreliable, unfairly prejudicial, and confusing and misleading to the jury.” Finding a similar lack of scientific standards, in People v. Thomas, the court upheld the exclusion of survey evidence where the methods used could not be reviewed because the number of people polled and the manner used to select participants was not disclosed. While surveys must be constructed with care, courts have held that “properly conducted opinion surveys may be useful in gauging community standards for the purposes of determining whether the materials at issue are obscene.”


Defendants often try to show that comparable materials are readily available in an attempt to establish that such items are accepted in the community, but courts have consistently held that merely presenting examples of materials available for sale in the community is not

147. Id. at 479.
149. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1232 & n.12 (explaining that the methods used by the sociologist in the “ethnographical” study did not meet the rigorous standards required to be admissible as evidence and were “simply not science”).
150. Belleville, 744 N.E.2d at 331 (citing People v. Thomas, 346 N.E.2d 190, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)).
151. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1229 (citing United States v. Various Articles of Merch., 750 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1984)).
sufficient. 152 A majority of courts apply a test developed in Womack v. United States to determine admissibility of comparable materials. 153 The Womack test requires that the defendant show: (1) the materials are actually “similar” to the material at issue in the trial, and (2) the comparison materials enjoy a “reasonable degree of community acceptance.” 154

In State v. Brouwer, the appellate court held that comparable materials offered by the defendant were properly excluded, even though similar to the materials at issue, explaining that “[w]hile we agree such evidence could be admissible in an obscenity prosecution, here [the defendant] tendered no proof the items offered enjoyed a reasonable degree of acceptance in the local community, such as expert testimony or cable, internet or satellite television provider subscription and sales records.” 155 Finding a similar lack of proof of community acceptance, the court in State v. Haltom found no abuse of discretion where the trial court excluded video tapes that were available in stores and a hotel nearby. 156 The court held that the materials “demonstrate only that other videos are available in the community” but did not prove acceptance. 157

Distribution figures for comparable materials have been held to be insufficient as evidence of acceptance, but courts have indicated that sales figures for comparable materials show demand and may be admissible to show acceptance. 158 Arguably, the fact that an industry generates billions of dollars in revenue reflects a certain level of

153. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d at 919 (citing Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
154. Id. (citing Womack, 294 F.2d at 206) (“Although decisions from other jurisdictions are not entirely uniform, the vast majority of state and federal courts have concluded such evidence is admissible subject to the predicate test for admissibility found in Womack v. United States.”) (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 921.
157. Id. at 239.
acceptance within the community. However, in State v. Brouwer, the court rejected a compilation of thirty photocopied cash register receipts showing purchases and rentals of sexually-oriented products, explaining that “such ‘self-selected’ evidence falls far short of the requisite showing to establish community acceptance.”

III. MEETING THE CHALLENGES — MAKING MILLER WORK IN THE INTERNET AGE

A. Which Community? — When in Cyberspace, Do as the “Netizens”? Do?

The legal standards that govern society must change to keep up with technology. While many critics have called for an end to the use of the “contemporary community standards” test in obscenity cases, it is highly unlikely that Miller will be overturned any time soon. As recently as 2002, in Ashcroft v. ACLU, a plurality of Justices on the Supreme Court agreed that Miller’s “contemporary community standards” test is applicable to the Internet. Therefore, there is a pressing need to make the test function more fairly in the Internet Age. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court described the Internet as a “unique and wholly new medium of worldwide communication.” Certainly, the Internet differs from other forms of...

159. Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 9 (quoting defense attorney Paul Cambria) (“It’s obvious that [pornography] is acceptable to a large number of people because they’re spending literally billions of dollars on adult material. There is no greater barometer of acceptance than people taking their money and allocating it toward something like that.”).
160. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d at 921 n.7.
161. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 79 (discussing “virtual communities” that consist of “netizens” and exist online, with members spread throughout the world but connected by these communities).
162. Handelman, supra note 48, at 737.
163. Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 531 (“When one attempts to apply the vague Miller standards to a real-life situation, the absurdity becomes glaring.”). See Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 38; Yun, supra note 45, at 358.
165. See Kostenko, supra note 109, at 126–28 (discussing whether it still makes sense to apply a geographic standard given society’s technological advances).
media and presents its own unique opportunities and challenges.\textsuperscript{167} One such challenge involves identifying the relevant community in the context of applying obscenity laws.\textsuperscript{168} Obscenity convictions can result in prison sentences and steep fines.\textsuperscript{169} An inability to define the community is unacceptable because it prevents the defendant from effectively exercising the right to present evidence to prove the community standard.\textsuperscript{170}

Since the Internet defies geographical boundaries, the "contemporary community standards" test must take on a different meaning when applied to the Internet.\textsuperscript{171} To fulfill the goals of obscenity law, communities are supposed to be able "to protect themselves from exposure to objectionable materials."\textsuperscript{172} Therefore, in Internet cases, the relevant community is really the cyber-community, since that is where the materials at issue are actually located.\textsuperscript{173} Cyber-communities have been defined as "virtual communities" comprised of "netizens" who "congregate and visit virtual neighborhoods that are spread all over the world."\textsuperscript{174} Obscenity on the Internet is invisible to those who do not travel on the Internet.\textsuperscript{175} Therefore, it is only appropriate that courts apply the

\textsuperscript{167} Nitke, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (explaining that Internet obscenity statutes have a greater potential to suppress protected speech than those obscenity statutes aimed at other forms of media); Ackerman, \textit{supra} note 11, at 37-38.

\textsuperscript{168} Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 nn.1-2, 492-93 (1957) (holding that the state criminal obscenity statute is constitutional); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)) (discussing categories of unprotected speech and stating that criminal punishment for use of "epithets or personal abuse" would not offend the Constitution); Robbins & Mason, \textit{supra} note 5, at 535 (discussing the potential penalties that accompany criminal obscenity convictions).

\textsuperscript{169} Sordillo, \textit{supra} note 82, at 632 ("But when the community remains undefined, evidentiary problems may arise. How can the defense determine the extent and scope of evidence to put forward on community standards when he or she does not know what 'community' the jury has in mind?").


\textsuperscript{171} Shiff, \textit{supra} note 11, at 750.

\textsuperscript{172} Kaplan, \textit{supra} note 122, at 193 (discussing the application of a cyber-community standard to the Internet); Kim & Paddon, \textit{supra} note 33, at 87.

\textsuperscript{173} Kim & Paddon, \textit{supra} note 33, at 79.

\textsuperscript{174} Kaplan, \textit{supra} note 122, at 193-97 (discussing the application of a cyber-community standard to the Internet). \textit{But see} United States v. Extreme Assoc., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to make special exceptions under existing obscenity jurisprudence merely because case
standards of the cyber-community.176 Using a “connection-based definition of community rather than a location-based one” enables online communities to determine their own standards just like a geographical community.177 A uniform standard is needed for Internet cases to prevent prosecutorial forum shopping, self-censorship, and impermissible restrictions on protected speech.178

Despite strong arguments favoring a cyber-community standard, courts have indicated an unwillingness to apply such a standard, holding instead that juries are to judge the materials based on the standards of the community where the material is received.179 It appears that a local, geographic definition of community will likely continue to be applied to determine whether materials posted on the Internet are obscene.180 Fortunately, technological advances can provide new tools to help make even local application of the test function more effectively in the Internet environment.181
B. "Searching" for the Standard—Proving the Community Values with Search Engine Data

Regarding evidentiary issues, there are two actions that can be taken to make Miller more workable. First, the State should be required to present evidence to prove the community standards.182 Some courts have attempted to take this approach, but have been reversed, and under current law, the prosecution is under no obligation to present evidence to prove the community standards.183 However, since the jury must determine whether the materials at issue violate community standards, those standards are an element of the offense, and the prosecution should be obligated to prove that element.184 Even if the court does not provide much-needed clarification on determining the relevant community, forcing the State to prove this element will, in and of itself, trigger an identification of the community. The State will have to identify the community to prove the standard, so that would effectively switch the burden from the defendant to the prosecution, where the burden rightfully belongs.185

Second, the courts should allow either party to use new search engine tracking technology to illuminate the standards of the community. Regardless of how the court defines the community, new Internet technology can shed light on the true values of the community.186 Two such technologies have been created to mine data

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182. United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that motion for directed verdict of acquittal should have been granted because jurors had "absolutely no evidentiary basis from which to 'recognize' any appeal to the prurient interest").

183. Miami v. Fla. Literary Distrib. Corp., 486 So. 2d 569, 570, 573 (Fla. 1986); Feldschneider v. State, 195 S.E.2d 184, 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (finding sufficient evidence to uphold obscenity conviction even though prosecution did not produce any evidence defining community standards because "jurors are entitled to use their common sense.... [t]hey most likely knew what 'contemporary community standards' are as regards the comic book in evidence, both in Clarke County and in other parts of the State of Georgia, and of the United States"); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 61-63.

184. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204-205 (1977) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("The Due Process Clause 'protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.'").

185. Id.

186. Miguel Helft, Google's New Tool Is Meant for Marketers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C4 ("The collection of search queries that people type into Google has been called a 'database of intentions' since it is a window into what people are interested in and, sometimes, what they are interested in buying.").
from Google’s powerful and popular search engine. The tools, Google Trends and Google Insights, allow a view into the public’s online searching habits by “graphically display[ing] the most popular search terms” and allowing “user[s] [to] compare multiple terms’ popularity over time.” Raymond McCowen proposed to introduce Google Trends data at his criminal obscenity trial, but since that time, Google has released a new tool. Google Insights is a powerful new extension of Google Trends, offering even greater ability to analyze the data by allowing users to “slice the data into finer geographic areas than with Trends . . . .” Since both tools can evaluate information in the aggregate for cities, states, or nations, the information can be assessed for virtually any community the court chooses.

From an evidentiary perspective, those tools can easily meet the requirements for admissibility in obscenity cases. First, since the technology is new, information technology professionals can be brought in as expert witnesses to explain how the tools work, which will meet the requirements of either explaining something a layperson would not normally understand without assistance, or if the jury is particularly computer-savvy, the testimony would most certainly be helpful until the technology is in wide-spread usage and is no longer “new.” Also, the data from the tools can be analogized to surveys or opinion polls, but with fewer relevancy issues. Where survey questions must be carefully crafted to ensure the actual issues are reflected in the questions, the Google queries are “crafted” by the searchers themselves, and have “been called a ‘database of intentions’ since [it provides] a window into what people are interested in.”

188. Helft, supra note 186; Hesse, supra note 34.
189. Helft, supra note 186.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 634–35.
193. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 71; Sordillo, supra note 82, at 640–641.
194. Helft, supra note 186.
While some may argue that interpretation of the searchers' intentions presents a problem, Google Insights provides clarification by differentiating between terms so that “[u]sers can slice the data by categories to distinguish, for example, searches for Apple the company and apple the fruit.”\textsuperscript{195} According to Google Trends, Pompano Beach, Florida ranked in the top five cities whose residents routinely search “salacious” topics\textsuperscript{196} and “people are at least as interested in group sex and orgies as they are in apple pie.”\textsuperscript{197} Arguably, the mere fact that a term is searched reflects, at a minimum, interest in the subject. And, since a certain number of searches are required before the data will register, a reasonable sample size is assured.\textsuperscript{198}

Additionally, search engine data illuminates the standard by providing access in an objective way, allowing the necessary insight without concerns about a lack of candor that can sometimes pose a problem on surveys.\textsuperscript{199} Especially in cases involving sensitive topics such as pornography and sex, sometimes there will be “jurors sitting on a jury panel who will condemn material that they routinely consume in private.”\textsuperscript{200} These tools provide that insight without self-reporting of the interviewees and the lack of candor that can accompany polls and surveys.\textsuperscript{201}

In the Internet equivalent of an evidentiary offering of comparable materials, a defense attorney in a federal obscenity trial brought in a computer and ran standard Google searches to show the jury the broad array of pornographic material that is available on the

\textsuperscript{195} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{196} Michael Mooney, Google Trends Reveals South Florida's Peculiar Preoccupation with Salacious Searches, MIAMI NEWS TIMES, July 17, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 13651625. \\
\textsuperscript{197} Richtel, supra note 181 (quoting Raymond McGowen’s defense attorney). \\
\textsuperscript{198} Steve Adams, Popularity Contest: New Google Tool Allows Businesses to Gauge Interest by City, PATRIOT LEDGER, Aug. 5, 2006, at 36 (“Now Google Trends enables visitors to enter any search term that generates a significant amount of traffic and provide a list of the ten cities or regions where the term is queried most frequently.”). \\
\textsuperscript{199} Richtel, supra note 181 (quoting defense attorney) (“[W]e can show how people really think and feel and act in their own homes . . . .”). \\
\textsuperscript{200} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{201} Id. (defense attorney commenting on how jurors sometimes condemn material during a trial that they consume in the privacy of their own homes).
He then ran searches for well-known sports figures to show, that by comparison, there are far more pornographic sites than sites discussing other popular interests. While the court allowed the demonstration, the searches did not sway the jury, as convictions were returned on all counts. Those searches, however, merely showed that similar materials were available on the Internet, without reflecting acceptance of those materials.

This is not the case with the Google Trends and Google Insights data. Originally created to help marketers track interest in their products and websites, these tools actually reflect access and interest, since Internet users actively engage the search engine and seek out the information reflected. The information provided by these new technological tools is analogous to sales figures, rather than distribution figures, in that it reflects affirmative action that has been taken on the part of searcher seeking the material, as opposed to merely showing what material is available. Unlike standard searches, the data from Google Trends or Google Insights can satisfy the Womack test for admissibility. The proponent of the evidence can ensure that the searches are for “similar” materials to those at issue by actually viewing samples of the sites pulled down by particular search terms. Acceptance is shown since searchers actively sought the material, rather than it merely being available with no way to gauge whether anyone accepted it or was even interested in it.

Recognition of the value of Google search engine data is not new. The Attorney General, in Gonzales v. Google, Inc.,

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202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Helft, supra note 186.
206. Helft, supra note 186.
208. Id. at 920 (explaining that to satisfy the first prong of the Womack test, “the materials being compared [must be] in fact ‘similar’ . . .”).
209. Id. (explaining that “[m]ere availability of similar material by itself” is not sufficient to establish acceptance in the community).
subpoenaed Google for search engine data to show the effectiveness of parental filters. The federal government sought a significant number of search queries entered by Google users and Google objected, fighting to protect the privacy of its customers. Google has now created its own tools to allow the public to benefit from mining of its data without compromising the privacy of its users.

CONCLUSION

Under current law, whether material is obscene is determined by applying the three-prong Miller test, which requires the trier of fact to apply contemporary community standards to two of the three prongs of the conjunctive test. While there are compelling arguments against using the Miller test in Internet cases, the courts seem to be favoring its application. In light of this, three actions can be taken to make the Miller test operate more fairly and effectively in the Internet Age.

First, it is crucial that the relevant community be easily identifiable so the defense can exercise its right to present relevant evidence. For Internet cases, the community should be a cyber-community rather than a geographic community, since the materials at issue are actually located in cyberspace. If the relevant community is a cyber-community, then the allegedly obscene materials will be judged based on the community standards of the Internet. Despite

211. Id. at 678–79.
212. Id. at 679.
213. See generally Helft, supra note 186; Richtel, supra note 181.
214. See discussion supra Part I.
215. See discussion supra Part II; Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 80 (quoting JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 32 (1st ed. 1996)) ("In defining community standard in Miller, the Supreme Court 'neither anticipated nor took into account the rapid advances in computer technology . . . [t]he rapid growth of national and global computer networks . . . [that] have allowed persons to interact without geographic constraints in a nonphysical universe called cyberspace.'").
216. See discussion supra Part II; United States v. Extreme Assoc., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 160 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to make special exceptions under existing obscenity jurisprudence merely because case involves Internet transmissions); Shiff, supra note 11, at 744–45 (citing United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 704–05 (6th Cir. 1996)).
217. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 632.
218. See discussion supra Part III; Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 81.
219. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 81.
strong arguments for such a standard, early cases reveal a reluctance to apply an Internet-based standard, as courts have chosen instead to apply the standards of the community where the material is sent or received.\textsuperscript{220}

Second, regardless of how the court defines the community, the State should be required to prove the community standards.\textsuperscript{221} Under current law, the State can choose to submit the materials at issue as the only proof of whether those materials are obscene.\textsuperscript{222} Obscenity charges are serious criminal offenses with convictions resulting in prison sentences and steep fines.\textsuperscript{223} Requiring the State to prove all the elements of a charge before taking away someone’s liberty is a fundamental principle of our law under the Due Process Clause.\textsuperscript{224} If the State alleges that the material violates a particular standard, then the State should have to prove exactly what that standard is.

And finally, new technologies should be utilized to help illuminate the community standards.\textsuperscript{225} Currently, Google has two tools available that can shed light on the values and standards of almost any community by showing which terms the residents of the community are most commonly searching.\textsuperscript{226} If the \textit{Miller} test is going to continue to be applied, the court must be open to allowing new technology to provide valuable insight so that the test can function more effectively and fairly in the Internet Age.

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Thomas}, 74 F.3d at 709 (quoting United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 1982)) ("[T]here is no constitutional impediment to the government’s power to prosecute pornography dealers in any district into which the material is sent."); \textit{United States v. Little}, No. 8:07-CR-170-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 151875, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008) (rejecting argument that a worldwide standard must be applied in Internet cases and applying the standards of the community where the materials were downloaded).

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{See} discussion \textit{supra} Part III; \textit{United States v. Klaw}, 350 F.2d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 1965).

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{United States v. Wild}, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Simply stated, hard core pornography . . . can and does speak for itself."); \textit{Schauer, supra} note 136, at 132.

\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Roth v. United States}, 354 U.S. 476, 492–93 (1957) (holding that the state criminal obscenity statute is constitutional); \textit{Robbins & Mason, supra} note 5, at 535 (discussing the potential penalties that accompany criminal obscenity convictions).


\textsuperscript{225} \textit{See} discussion \textit{supra} Part III.

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{See} Richtel, \textit{supra} note 181.