Telos and Techne

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TELOS AND TECHNE

Paul Knox*

ABSTRACT
It seems reasonable to assert that the planning profession should be understood as serving society by providing vision, anticipation, innovation, and inspiration in the cause of human flourishing; that its telos is to create functional, efficient, and sustainable physical environments and to contribute to the material realization of societal aspirations of what it means to live well. But it is the techne—the application of the field’s context-dependent armory of tactics, practices, concepts, approaches, and methods—that counts most in determining success in the cause of human flourishing. This article comments on the tensions between telos and techne in planning.

CONTEXT
In short, planning offers the promise of creating better cities, whether at the scale of streets, neighborhoods, or city-regions. The problem for planners is that theirs will always be a dependent field, entwined in complex and temporary assemblages of expertise and interests that constrain their professional autonomy. In addition to the calculative practices of developers, financiers, and builders, planners’ work depends, project by project, plan by plan, on multiple federal, state, and local agencies and on interactions among auxiliary actors in transportation and utility companies, engineering and technical subcontractors, surveyors, market analysts, appraisers, property managers, chambers of commerce, lawyers, and title insurance and trust companies. Born a hybrid creature at the turn of the twentieth century, dedicated on the one hand to progressive reform but charged on the other with economic development and the management of urban land, the field has co-evolved not only with the property development and construction industries, with building and transportation technologies, and with state regulatory frameworks but also with social movements, environmental movements, conservation movements and its big sister, architecture.1 All this, meanwhile, has been subject to the “path-shaping” moments of capitalism’s regular and recurrent crises; and embedded in

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the evolutionary twists and turns of an overall political economy that routinely generates conflict and contradiction and demands compromise.

Within these broader parameters, the accumulation of ideas and dispositions that began with Olmsted—\(^2\) and grew with Burnham, Howard, Perry, Mumford, Moses, Stein, Nolen, and others—has left the field with a distinctive ethos: a set of beliefs, values, and aspirations that underpin both praxis and discourse. The cumulative outcome is a challenging amalgam of concern with health, safety, order, social harmony, civic beauty, social equity, environmental quality, and utility, functionalism, and efficiency in the organization of space.

So much, perhaps, for the telos and ethos of planning; it is the techne—the application of the field’s context-dependent armory of tactics, practices, concepts, approaches, and methods—that counts most in determining success in the cause of human flourishing. The foundational concepts derived from the seers (zoning, social mix, neighborhood units, superblocks, new towns, garden suburbs, hub-and-spoke transportation systems, regulatory codes, and so on) were crucial here. They have been sustained within internal discursive forums, consecrated in textbooks, and baked into accredited university curricula. By the early 1960s they amounted, in Bourdieu’s terminology, to a “force field” that would shape the techne of planning and determine the effectiveness of the profession. As we know now, this foundational force field soon became something of a Bermuda Triangle in which key dimensions of the telos—human flourishing, social, economic, and environmental justice, and the public interest—were often lost. Jane Jacobs could see it coming.\(^3\) It was a miscarriage precipitated by a mixture of hubris, bureaucratic aggression, and disciplinary shortcomings.

Newly granted the power and resources to reconceptualize the city in innovative modern form in the two decades following World War II, the profession developed an evangelical spirit: Cities should be better places; they could be. It was a golden age for planning. Time magazine featured Edmund Bacon, executive director of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission, on its November 6, 1964, cover. Encouraged by public confidence in professional expertise, bolstered by an overly optimistic view of social and economic trends, heavily conditioned by hero worship of the pre-war seers, and super confident in their own abilities, planners unleashed their good intentions in ever-grander schemes. The spirit of the time was personified by Robert Moses and his team in New York, wrestling urbanization into a manifestation of the American Dream in which the freedom to build for money

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and the freedom to drive everywhere, anytime, were the principal assumptions. The mantle of “bureaucratic evangelism” adopted by Moses and many other less powerful and less charismatic planners seemed to fit well with the telos of the profession; and had the additional benefit of insulating practitioners from the conflicts and critiques that inevitably arose from the pursuit of their work.⁴ They were all, meanwhile, beneficiaries of an intellectual legacy that resonated with environmental determinism and was tinged with paternalism, giving them a misplaced visionary confidence. “Tasked with articulating progressive solutions to urban development, the design fields acquired new significance for which they were not entirely prepared. In seizing the chance to create the good city, architects and planners drew on ideas, preconceptions, and habits of mind accumulated from premodern times onward, buoyed by the revolutionary fervor of the interwar period.”⁵

Compounding the limitations of this intellectual legacy were the shortcomings of the new, hastily assembled academic discipline. By the 1960s, the field was firmly ensconced in academia, with formally accredited curricula. But the field had little to offer by way of a distinctive body of knowledge underpinned by explanatory theory. It made for an anarchic intellectual milieu. In its search for legitimacy and a distinctive academic identity and practical purpose, planning moved away from its shared roots with architecture toward positivist systems-based and rational decision-making approaches, and then to a pragmatic political-bureaucratic approach, all within the space of a couple of decades. As a result, the field lost much of its visionary capacity, its claims on the guardianship of an overarching public interest and, ultimately, its professional authority. At the forefront of what Peter Hall called planners’ “borrowed intellectual baggage” were “scatterings of social science” from the Chicago School of sociology, geographers’ concepts of functional regions and central places, economists’ forecasting models, cost-benefit analysis, and theories of bid-rent, and the locational economics of the new field of regional science, along with engineers’ models of traffic flow and the systems thinking of another new field, cybernetics. These were employed simply as “snippets of useful knowledge,” not as any consistent or coherent framework of understanding.⁶ Rather, they were deployed as justification for a process of incremental planning: the “comprehensive-rational” approach based on sequential stages of goal formulation, problem formulation, generation and evaluation of options, and policy selection.

⁵ Knox, 2020, 166.
As the shortcomings of such an approach became apparent, other borrowings led to different approaches. The field’s own theories (what have become known as “planning theories”) were inward-looking, second-order theories that took as their subject the process of planning: philosophical accounts of how, ideally, planners should plan; or typologies of how planners actually did plan. The idea with most traction in academia was “advocacy planning,” based on a model adapted from the legal profession. But mainstream planning ideology, having generated various “disparate, incommensurable, and idiosyncratic ‘conceptions’ of urban planning,” became “deeply confused as to the meaning, properties, and tasks of theoretical enquiry.” One consequence of this intellectual involution, as Robert Beauregard noted, was to move planning education away from a studio model to the pedagogical model of the social sciences: the lecture and seminar, with students learning through texts rather than direct problem-solving.

Meanwhile, beyond academia:

... planning practice diversified into a multitude of specialties: environmental, manpower, social planning, health planning, transportation, energy planning, and regional planning along with the traditional land-use and housing ... A variety of social planners challenged the increasingly specialized physical planners. As a result, planning practice underwent centrifugal disintegration. The common object of interest—the city—that had initially attracted “progressive” reformers was lost.

Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky observed that planning had extended so thinly over so wide an area that it was almost meaningless: “if planning is everything, maybe it’s nothing.” In the absence of a clear disciplinary identity, the combination of evangelism, determinism, and paternalism produced a professional make-up that proved tragically mismatched to the telos. Even in their finest hour, planners were forced to watch themselves fail. Blinkered technical rationality, hubris, and “moral inversion” led them to get bogged down in “bureaucratic offensives” of urban renewal and highway construction to the point

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where the communities whose lives they had hoped to improve were angry and afraid. Before they knew it, their techne had led them to become social gatekeepers.

A new conventional wisdom emerged. Jane Jacobs had, indeed, called it. She had argued that cities were serving as “sacrificial victims” to the misguided ideas of the pre-war seers. The pursuit of their ideas, she asserted, had taken away the life and vitality of cities, tearing out their sclerotic hearts only to replace them with a “great blight of Dullness” in the form of high-rise apartment blocks; and meanwhile freezing the existing social order in physical form. Adherence to the dogma of land-use segregation, she pointed out, resulted in the loss of vitality and serendipity in urban life. Left to planners, she argued, city landscapes “will be spacious, parklike, and uncrowded. They will feature long green vistas. They will be stable and symmetrical and orderly. They will be clean, impressive, and monumental. They will have all the attributes of a well-kept, dignified cemetery.”

By the mid-1970s, planning was no longer understood by the public as a real force for progressive socioeconomic change. Critics in the popular press tended increasingly to portray planners as authoritarian and unaccountable. Practitioners and academics had their own doubts. Alison Ravetz concluded that planning had been transformed from an “enabling” to a “disabling” profession as a result of its professional ethos and its evangelical mantle that enabled practitioners to turn a deaf ear to criticism. Leonie Sandercock characterized planning as having pursued “anti-democratic, race and gender-blind, and culturally homogenizing practices.” The tide of opinion had turned; it was the end of an era. It coincided with the flatlining of growth in real incomes and it contributed to the emergence of the neoliberal political economy.

But if planners were not entirely prepared for the responsibilities they acquired in the postwar period, they were certainly not prepared for the sudden change of circumstances brought about by neoliberalism. The telos of the profession was dissonant with free enterprise, everyone-for-themselves neoliberalism, its techne redundant. Landowners and developers challenged the fundamental power of city governments to protect public health, safety, and welfare.
through planning regulations. Libertarians and property-rights activists advanced the notion that zoning and regulations on real estate depress potential property values, lobbying for laws that would treat most zoning and land-use regulations as takings. Others voted with their feet, moving to privatized spaces that are exempt from municipal land-use planning regulations: the “secession of the successful.” The wealthy in effect withdrew their dollars from the support of public spaces and institutions shared by all, dedicating the savings to their own private services.15 Encouraged by a banking industry that was increasingly lenient toward borrowers, it did not take long for suburban landscapes to reflect the result: a proliferation of the suburban bling of “Vulgaria” and “Privatopia.”16 David Harvey, described the packaged landscapes of privately-planned communities as paradigmatic “degenerate utopias:” degenerate, in Harvey’s view, because the oppositional force implicit in the progressive and utopian ideals central to the telos of planning had been perverted, in the course of translation into private enclaves, into an intensification of commodity culture.17

City governments meanwhile became more entrepreneurial in competing for investment. Public-private partnerships became the standard vehicle for achieving urban change, replacing the strategic role of city planning departments with piecemeal deal-making.18 It was no coincidence that private capital had become available for public-private partnerships just as cities were facing retrenchment and fiscal stress: both were the product of the phase of overaccumulation following the economic system-shock precipitated by the OPEC price hike and the recession of the mid-1970s. Changing circumstances in international, national, and real estate markets brought the private sector to the public sector as much as ideological and fiscal shifts brought the public sector to the private sector.

Just as city governments needed to become more competitive, their planners were placed at a further disadvantage by the globalization of finance and the emergence of a “global corporate urban intelligence complex”—international property development companies, global consulting firms such as AECOM, Bechtel, Mercer, and McKinsey; and global technology and engineering firms like

Arup and Siemens—and their armies of private-sector consultant planners. Academic planning theory and local initiative were both sidelined by the “traveling ideas” circulated among the corporate urban intelligence complex in trade shows such as the Marché international des professionnels de l’immobilier (MIPIM), a property fair held annually in Cannes. In the echo chamber of international conferences and trade shows, the most seductive of all traveling ideas was property-led brownfield redevelopment, resulting in the serial reproduction of predictable ensembles of office buildings, retail space, condominium towers, cultural amenities, renovated spaces, landscaping, and street furniture.

Property-led development was supercharged by the surplus capital of oligarchs and oil sheikhs and “flight capital” from war zones and failed states. When, after the scandalous financial crisis of 2008, Swiss banks were less willing to fulfil their traditional role of no-questions-asked banking, the property markets of Manhattan, Chicago, Los Angeles, Vancouver, and other world cities filled the gap—somewhere for the global super-rich to park their money. Property in the “alpha districts” of these cities became a form of reserve currency for the “one percent” as rich foreigners paid large sums for trophy properties. In this context, city planners found themselves functioning as a special category of wealth managers, directing the redevelopment of under-performing property markets, and incentivizing private real estate development while maintaining the conditions for capital accumulation: ensuring predictable conditions for real estate development and orchestrating the efficiency of urban settings as sites of production and consumption. Consequently, planning has sacrificed its roles as visionary and idealist and abandoned its responsibility “to be a source of inspiration and to produce ideas about what might be and what ought to be.”

THE STRUGGLE FOR RELEVANCE

Looking back at decades of urban development that has been—largely—environmentally insensitive, aesthetically underwhelming, dysfunctional, and socially regressive, we should bear in mind that it has not all been planners’ fault. Planning has always been a dependent field, and its inability to articulate a compelling role in the political economy of neoliberalism has meant that it has steadily become more so. Nor did it mean that planners as individuals have abandoned their telos (even if they have collectively lost sight of it). Many (most?) individual practitioners, educators, and students still sincerely assert that they are deeply committed to social, economic, and environmental justice. What is needed

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is a recovery of the collective telos and a new techne: new approaches geared to contemporary circumstances.

Unfortunately, one of the first and most widely embraced new approaches was regressive, in every sense of the word. New Urbanism was a copyrighted version of degenerate utopias where design codes became behavior codes. There was almost nothing new about New Urbanism apart from its sophistication in organization, branding, and marketing. It was substantively a derivative hybrid of ideas and impulses that drew on the intellectuals’ utopias of the nineteenth century and the techne of twentieth-century seers. But it seemed, for a while, to provide planners with an opportunity to recover from their marginalized situation, it sat comfortably with the sensibilities of neoliberalism, and was enthusiastically received by credulous journalists (as well as savvy developers).

The failings of New Urbanism “estranged it from all but the most conservative design schools.” Into the vacuum came other elements of a potential new techne. Conservation and heritage protection shifted from being a marginal activity in urban planning to being a central element of the field, and from being conceived as a restraint on development to a catalyst for it. It was certainly an area where planners could reassert some relevance, pointing to the beneficent effects in terms of tourism, neighborhood revitalization, and the restoration of depreciated downtown real estate values (but prudently not drawing attention to the gentrification effects).

Other elements have been added to the contemporary armory of tactics, practices, concepts, and approaches of the field, each grasped by academics and practitioners as a potential escape from the professional suffocations of a neoliberal political economy. Landscape Urbanism, Sustainability, Smart Growth, Tactical Urbanism, Smart Cities, and Resilience, for example. But each has its own shortcomings and limitations. Landscape urbanism revives Patrick Geddes’s and Ian McHarg’s laudable traditions of “designing with nature” and merges them with systems-thinking from ecology and new digital visualization and rendering techniques in a particular version of sustainable development. But while there is general agreement about the symptoms of unsustainable development (structural economic decline, environmental degradation, outmigration, segregation,

20 Knox, 2008.
exclusion, antisocial behavior, and loss of distinctiveness and sense of place), specifying just what is—or may be—sustainable is still problematic, and it is not easy to find compelling, comprehensive examples of sustainable or landscape urbanism.

Smart growth is a fuzzy and elastic concept that boils down to guiding growth to more efficient locations at higher densities. In that sense it can be seen as a stealthy euphemism for old-fashioned land-use planning and growth management of the sort that cannot be entertained in the lexicon of a neoliberal political economy. Tactical urbanism involves unsanctioned activist or community-led guerilla tactics in the spirit of the right-to-the-city movement, aimed at reclaiming at least some of the field’s ideological affinity for social justice. It centers on small-scale interventions: pop-up parks, temporary community gardens, art installations, and so on. But the aesthetic and sense of cool hipsterism propagated by tactical urbanism plays directly into the neoliberal “creative city” discourse. In practical terms it amounts to nothing more than an invitation to gentrification.

The two themes that have elicited the most widespread enthusiasm recently are smart cities and resilience. The narrative around smart cities emphasizes the potential efficiency, flexibility, and sustainability of “wired” urban environments, together with the prospect of making such cities more competitive in the global market. This narrative mobilizes and recycles two long-standing tropes in planning circles: the city conceived as a system of systems, and a utopian discourse framed around urban pathologies and their cure.23 In many ways, “smart” has superseded “sustainable” as the principal prism through which the future of cities is now viewed, more immediately useful in attracting investment and key workers. That is certainly the conclusion of the global corporate urban intelligence complex, with technology, engineering, and consulting firms like Amazon, Arup, Cisco, Facebook, General Electric, Hitachi, Huawei, IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, Philips, SAP, Siemens, and Alphabet’s subsidiaries Google and Sidewalk Labs investing significantly in the prospect. But, as with sustainable urbanism, it is not easy to find full-fledged examples of smart cities. Most smart city developments, notably, are only fragments or layers within cities—disconnected and sealed-off technological enclaves of urban fabric that Federico Cugurullo has characterized as Frankenstein Urbanism: “unsuccessful experiments generated by the forced union of different,

incongruous parts.” But a fully-fledged smart city would need a free flow of data across sectors and systems that are normally separate, something that could only be realized with a new kind of city government—a public-private partnership with one or more of the global corporate urban intelligence giants providing mass monitoring and data collection. It therefore raises the deeply sinister prospect of the manipulation of a compliant and accommodating citizenry. It also plays into what Shoshana Zuboff dubbed “surveillance capitalism,” the commodification and exploitation of personal information. Meanwhile, smart technologies create new vulnerabilities and threats, including making city infrastructure and services insecure, brittle, and open to extended forms of criminal activity: an issue that planners are ill-equipped to deal with.

The narrative around resilience has been framed by an increased awareness of this kind of risk and vulnerability. The concept has been foregrounded by the 2008–2009 global financial meltdown, by extreme weather events, flooding, and peri-urban wildfires associated with global warming; and, most recently, by the coronavirus pandemic and consequent economic recession. Like its ideological twin, sustainability, resilience is a “bridging concept” that can be used and interpreted in very different ways. At the simplest level, increased resilience implies the ability to endure greater stresses or to bounce back faster after a disturbance: what has become known as “engineering” or “equilibrium” resilience. A more satisfactory understanding of resilience includes the inherent conditions that allow a system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event adaptive processes that help the system to reorganize, change, and learn in response to the event.

The attractiveness of the concept has drawn the attention of many of the same actors behind the idea of smart cities: property development companies, global consulting firms such as AECOM, Bechtel and McKinsey, ICT companies like Cisco and IBM, and global technology and engineering firms like Arup and


Siemens. Together with supranational organizations such as UN Habitat, the World Bank, and the nonprofit Rockefeller Foundation, they constitute a “resilience machine.”\textsuperscript{28} This commodification of resilience and its deployment as part of neoliberal “shock doctrine” (taking advantage of disasters to usher in policies such as privatization and surveillance)\textsuperscript{29} means that resilience sits comfortably in the discourses and practices of neoliberalism. Its implicit appeal is to support the status quo and promote business as usual. That is, the need to manage and adapt to shocks and stresses, rather than seeking to redress or rework the political and economic forces behind them.\textsuperscript{30} Meanwhile, as a bridging concept it has perhaps inevitably become overexposed, its inherited meanings from disparate disciplines—engineering, psychology, community studies, economics, ecology, management, and so on—making for ambiguity and confusion instead of mutual understanding.

All this begs the question of how planning might recapture its mojo and offer again the genuine prospect of building a changing world responsibly, fulfilling its promise of creating better cities and supporting human flourishing. We should bear in mind that the field only acquired the capacity to be a significant force with the welfare capitalism of the New Deal, only to lose it between 1968 and 1973 when the critique articulated by Jane Jacobs was compounded by economic crisis and the emergence of a neoliberal political economy. In this context, Milton Friedman’s observation seems pertinent: “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.”\textsuperscript{31}

The societal perception of the scale of crisis seems critical here. It requires what the ancient Greeks called \textit{aporia:} some combination of economic, technological, social, political, or cultural change that leads large (or key) sections of society to question accepted ideals and practices. (As, for example, the European political crises of 1848 that brought the beginnings of deep social and political reform; the upheavals and disjunctions that followed the First World War and fostered the introduction of welfare states; the Great Depression that produced Keynesianism; and the 1973 OPEC-induced inflationary crisis that unleashed

\textsuperscript{28} Bohland, J., Davoudi, S., and Lawrence, J., eds., \textit{The Resilience Machine}. New York; Routledge, 2109.


There is a plausible case that accelerating climate change amounts to such a crisis.

The question then becomes, following Friedman: what ideas are lying around? We don’t need another set of borrowed intellectual baggage, or a solipsistic manifesto of the kind favored by architects. To fulfill the telos of the profession, it surely has to be a compelling idea rooted in progressive reform and characterized by strategic purpose. A Green New Deal, perhaps? A systems-driven approach with responsibility for federal, regional, and local planning agencies to strategically orchestrate investment in clean energy research, a distributed smart grid and high-speed rail network, the retrofitting of vulnerable cities with green infrastructure, and the managed retreat from coastal and desert areas. This, of course, presupposes a crisis-induced transformation of the overall political economy in which planning agencies are embedded: a realignment of politics, a reinvigoration of public service, and a renewed commitment to environmental and social justice.

Planning agencies, in turn, would need practitioners to free themselves of the “force field” of conventional wisdoms that are still tinged with the mucky end of the determinist stick and “good-design-can-save-us” wishful thinking that is propagated in much of the professional and academic literature and sustained by the institutional inertia of the APA, AICP, ACSP, and PAB.

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34 Respectively: the American Planning Association (APA) which is comprised of more than 40,000 members; the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP) which is a 17,000-some member subset of the APA reflecting elevated levels of education, experience, and passing grade on a qualifying examination; the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP) which is comprised of accredited planning programs; and the Planning Accreditation Board (PAB) which is operated jointed by the APA and ACSP that is charged with credentialing planning programs.